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Abstract 
 The emergence of full-fledged reforms in Kenya from the introduction of the 
Retirement Benefits Authority in 1997 has rekindled hopes among the ageing population in 
Kenya. This paper examines the effect of the NSSF Act 2013 contribution rate by use of a 
contribution rate model as well as Kenyans’ perception towards the yet to be implemented 
Act by use of questionnaire analysis. The study asserts that the set 6% is sufficient to meet the 
welfare conditions of Kenyans. Further, this study also identifies the main social welfare 
reforms put in place, as well as the effects and challenges towards implementation of the 
reforms on the performance of the industry with a critical theoretical look at the NSSF Act 
2013.  
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Introduction 
 Over the past three decades, the living condition of older persons in Kenya has 
deteriorated. This is as a result of the erosions of their economic power, changes in the family 
structures and roles, particularly on the care of older members of the immediate family 
unsustainability of the pension schemes and inability of government to fulfill her expected 
role in the care and support of older persons in the community (Reynaund, 2000). Worldwide 
older persons are regarded as vulnerable group, hence, it has been accepted that older persons, 
the children and women are in dare need of government attention. This is because poverty 
affects this class of people than any other categories in contemporary world especially in 
developing countries. Various efforts by various successive regimes in the country to address 
the needs of older members of the society have proved abortive.  
 Kenya being a British colony has adopted so much from the British system of saving. 
These include the formation of the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), similar to the state 
pensions of the United Kingdom (UK) and the occupational pension funds (Mghali, 2003). 
Ginneken (1998) defines social security as benefits that the society provides to individuals 
and households through public and collective measures to guarantee them a minimum 
standard of living and to protect them against low or declining living standards arising out of 
a number of basic risks and needs. Social security is thus a social insurance program. For our 
case in Kenya we have NSSF. 
 The social security after retirement concerns for the Kenyan work force is a factor that 
leads to growth of the pension industry. This has been so because a large task force of the 
Kenyan population is increasingly being employed in the private sector which has designated 
occupational pension schemes for the employees. There is need to replace income after the 
active working years for a person who has been used to a pay check at the end of every 
month. Reforms to improve the efficiency of the social security sector are therefore highly 
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needed. A vast understanding about the operation and implications of these laws is highly 
needed thus the basis of this report. The dilemma of efficiency of these reforms with regards 
to the pension industry is a big question to all stakeholders.  
 This paper evaluates the impact of reforms on both private and the social security 
system in Kenya. Specifically;  
 To identify the possible impacts of these identified reforms. 
 To identify the challenges towards implementation of these reforms. 
 The remaining part of the paper examines similar work done in pension reforms while 
section 3 looks at the contribution rate model. The data analysis and discussion of the results 
is done in section 4.  The fifth section discusses the research findings which are based on 
analyzing the impacts of pension reforms.  
 
Related literature 
 The need for reforms in social security is a question being impressed by many 
countries around the world. The OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría asserts that “Further 
reforms are needed”. We cannot risk a resurgence of old-age poverty in the future. This risk is 
heightened by growing earnings inequality in many countries, which will feed through into 
greater inequality in retirement. This struggle to meet the above addressed issue is the main 
reason as to why many countries are reforming their pension industry.  
 The lifecycle hypothesis by Modigliani, (1963) deals with economic decisions on 
retirement saving in particular the rationalization of an individual’s income in order to 
maximize its utility over his lifetime. It stated that households accumulate savings during 
their working careers up to their retirement, and de-accumulate wealth thereafter.  
 The Chilean model of pension reform of 1981 replaced an earlier pay-as-you-go 
(PAYGO) and public pension system with a new compulsory system of individual funded and 
privately managed pension accounts based on Defined Contribution (DC) principles was 
credited for linking old age social security with the facilitation of macroeconomic growth. 
World Bank personnel in particular suggested that the Chilean case proved that a shift of 
pension provisions from the public to the private sector and from PAYGO to DC would 
maintain social protection while increasing economic growth via the deepening of financial 
markets (World Bank, 1994). In fact, the system delivered poverty pensions rather than old 
age security to most contributors. The former center-left Chilean government decided to 
phase in a new public and tax-financed basic social pension system in order to provide 
additional income for current and future pensioners with very small funded pensions (Riesco 
2009). 
 Secondly came the Nigerian 2004 reform which was inspired by the experience of 
Chile, an economically more advanced country, Nigerian policy-makers attempted to 
replicate the 1981 Chilean pension reform Orifowomo 2006; Casey, 2009. Before the 2004 
reform in Nigeria, the formal private sector was covered by a pay-as-you-go pension scheme, 
the Nigerian Social Insurance and Trust Fund (NSITF). However, its scope and coverage 
were more limited than those of public sector schemes. Only some larger enterprises offered 
access to the scheme and, since its foundation in 1994, the NSITF’s accumulated capital and 
pension payouts were low while administrative costs were high (ILO 2006). The resulting 
pattern of pension provisions was highly fragmented, and the available data suggest that only 
10 percent of the Nigerian workforce (about 4.8 million out of about 48 million) belonged to 
the Formal employment sector, out of which about 3.7 million also belonged to a pension 
scheme (Casey, 2009).  
 On the Kenyan scenario Odundo, (2003) report on Supervision of public pension 
funds in Kenya points out some of the loopholes in the Kenyan social security system. One of 
the main challenges is the fact that the Kenyan investment profile is characterized by a lack of 
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diversity. Further Odundo, (2003) points out the fact that NSSF Kenya is faced with poor 
record keeping. This has led to delays in determining benefits precipitating a US$100 million 
unallocated suspense account. Figure 1 below is shows the different reforms that have so far 
been implemented in Kenya. 
 
Figure 1: Different pension reforms  
 
Methodology 
Contribution rate model definition 
 The objective of a pension model is to evaluate the financial viability of a pension 
scheme or pensioner to confirm the income and expenditure that should remain in force over 
a definite period of time or make recommendations on the necessity to revise the contribution 
rate to maintain a sustainable benefit (Latulippe, 1997) 
 
Model Assumptions 
 Assume that salary amount, S; Interest rate, r; Salary increase rate, e; Assuming an 
individual would like to maintain a given lifestyle after retirement his/her salary is expected 
to increase constantly at a rate 𝑟𝑠. Then the monthly effective will be 
  𝑟𝑚 =(1+𝑟𝑠)1/12 -1 
 A mortality table will then be prepared from the principle;  qx =  1 − PX 
 Table 1 below shows values used for the specific assumption; 
Table 1 
Assumed Age of Entry 25 
Assumed Retirement age 60 
age of the ,member at date of valuation 30 
Rate of pension accrual 80 
Rate of Pension Increase 5.00% 
Assumed annual salary growth 1.50% 
Interest Rate 18% 
Inflation Rate 7.36% 
Table 2 
Male Percentage 67% 
Female Percentage 33% 
Salary level Min Max 
Males $4,011 $14,815 
Females $4,411 $11,024 
 
Dollar - Kshs Conversion Rate 90 
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  The model also incorporated mortality assumption; that is the Association of Kenya 
Insurers (AKI) tables were used. 
 
Model Specification 
 The main objective was to determine the appropriate contribution rate that the 
individual can use to contribute an amount that will be able to sustain him/her during the 
retirement period. This was by use of a contribution rate model whereby a hypothetical 
situation of an average earning Kenyan was considered. 
 All the contributions were accumulated to age 60 years and the expected pension 
benefits discounted to age 60 years, using excel functionalities. An appropriate standard 
contribution rate that can make the difference between the individual contributions and 
his/her benefits equal to zero such that he/she does not under or over contribute was 
calculated. The model was meant to give an approximate estimate of the appropriate 
contribution rate to help compare with the proposed 6% in the proposed bill.  
 The model uses the following pension standard contribution rate formulas; 
 
Attained Age Standard Contribution Rate (AASCR) 
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑅 = (𝑅−𝑋)𝑆𝐴 ×�1+𝑒1+𝑖�𝑅−𝑋×𝑎𝑅′
𝑆×𝑎𝑅−𝑋⌉��������          (1) 
 Where R is assumed retirement age, X is the age of member at date of valuation, S is 
salary at date of valuation, A is rate of pension accrual, E is assumed annual earning (salary) 
growth, I is discount rate, 𝑎𝑅1  is value of annuity payable from age R (allowing for any 
spouses pension and pension increases) and 𝑎𝑅−𝑋⌉�������� is an annuity to determine the present 
value of all future earnings (Allowing for the timing of contributions and salary increases) 
 
Entry Age Standard Contribution Rate (EASCR) 
𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑅 = (𝑅−𝐸)𝑆𝐴 ×�1+𝑒1+𝑖�𝑅−𝐸×𝑎𝑅′′
𝑆×𝑎𝑅−𝐸⌉��������          (2) 
Where E is assumed entry age, aR−E⌉ �������� is an annuity to determine the present value of all future 
earnings for a new entrant and aR′′ is value of annuity payable from age R, based on assumed 
proportion of males and females in the scheme (Allowing for any spouses pension and 
pension increases) 
 
Projected Unit Standard Contribution Rate (PUSCR) 
𝑃𝑈𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 1×𝑆𝐴 ×�1+𝑒1+𝑖�𝑅−𝑋×𝑎𝑅′
𝑆×𝑎1⌉�          (3) 
Where is a1⌉�  is an annuity to determine the present value of earnings over the next year 
(Allowing for the timing of contributions and salary increases)  
Current Unit Standard Contribution Rate (CUSCR) 
𝐶𝑈𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 1×𝑆×(1+𝑒)𝐴 ×� 11+𝑖�𝑅−𝑋×𝑎𝑅′ +(𝐶𝑈𝐴𝐿×𝑒)
𝑆×𝑎1⌉�        (4) 
Where: 
𝐶𝑈𝐴𝐿 = 𝑃×𝑆
𝐴
× � 1
1+𝑖
�
𝑅−𝑋 × 𝑎𝑅′         (5) 
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Data analysis, discussions and findings 
The data analysis and finding 
 Data was obtained from self-administered questionnaires, completed by 50% of 
respondents from different pension schemes in Kenya. Secondary data was also obtained 
from various researches done on the Kenyan pension industry.  
The four funding methods of valuation of pension standard contribution rates gives the 6% 
line graph to be the average for all the four methods. This implies that the stated contribution 
rate in the act could be fair and is note lean on any particular individuals. The 6% deduction is 
not to be imposed on employees immediately but will be increased gradually over the next 
five years. Employers will also be required to match the deduction by every employee. An 
average employee changes jobs at least seven times during his or her working life. Under the 
current law, he can access up to 75 per cent of his pension contribution.  
 
Attained Age Method (Attained Age Standard Contribution Rate (AASCR)) 
 In this method, the model targets a stable level of contribution which can then be 
adjusted as appropriate with adjustment in the model parameter (age, salary retirement etc.)  
Assuming that the benefits are expected to be paid over the expected future membership of 
the beneficiary, this method gives a total contribution rate of 10.33%. This is to mean 5.16% 
employer contribution and the same rate also applies to the employee contribution. The 
deviation between the model result (5.16%) and 6% percent could be as a result of other extra 
scheme expenses like the regulatory levy and scheme administrative expenses. 6% could be a 
good contribution rate according to Attained age method. 
 
Entry Age Method (Entry Age Standard Contribution Rate (EASCR) 
 The results are similar to AASCR above. The only difference is that for this method 
the calculations are performed at the beginning of the member`s service period. In this case 
the entry age assumption (25 years) was used. The method gives a total contribution rate of 
11.6%. This means 5.8% employer contribution and the same rate also applies to the 
employee contribution. These results are on average in agreement with 6% in the NSSF Act.  
 
Projected Unit Method (Projected Unit Standard Contribution rate (PUSCR)) 
 In this method, the present value of all benefits that will accrue in the year following 
the valuation date, by reference to service in that year and projected final earnings divided by 
the present value of all members earnings in that year. The method gives a total contribution 
rate of 11.92% as highlighted below. This is to mean 5.86% employer contribution and the 
same rate also applies to the employee contribution. These results are on average in 
agreement with 6% in the NSSF Act.  
 
Different stakeholders’ perspective about Impacts of pension reforms in Kenya. 
  Scheme Members expressed fears that whereas there is an opt-out clause in the Act, 
it could prove hard for companies to get the necessary waiver to run their own schemes. As 
the country moves towards implementing the proposed reforms, the NSSF will be expected to 
operate three funds the current provident fund, the new pension fund and a new provident 
fund.  
   
Fund Managers  
  A higher contribution as expressed by some respondents means an additional expense 
on employers and may affect the new employment thus erasing the need to create about one 
million jobs promised by the Government. The old provident fund will be given five years to 
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settle its dues to members, after which it shall be closed down. East Africa has been looking 
for ways to reform its pensions sector. 
On the other hand this increase in contribution rate may prompt an increase in the level of 
contribution to be invested hence more income for fund managers. 
 
NSSF Perspective  
  NSSF research justifying the need for NSSF’s transformation depicts that only 3.1% 
of elderly in Kenya above the age of 55 had reported receipt of any pension. It is therefore 
with this concern that we need such a reform to address the above issue. 
 
Other factors that affect the performance of the pension industry in Kenya 
  The respondents indicated that the determinants already identified may influence the 
financial performance of pension schemes. The trustees considered the global economic 
conditions as crucial in determining how the Kenyan economy is going to perform. They 
cited the recent 2008-2009 global financial crisis which affected the general world economy 
.This crisis also shrank the gains which had been made by the retirement benefits schemes as 
most investments incurred losses. 
  They also noted the importance of analyzing the political situation in the country 
before investing in any sector. The long term strategies adopted by the scheme determine the 
strategies to be adopted by the fund managers in investing the schemes funds. This goes a 
long way in delivering good returns to the scheme.  
  Government regulation is also another factor which affects the performance of 
retirement benefit schemes. Some regulations cited was where the government allowed 
deferred members to withdraw some of their benefits before retirement. This occasioned 
losses in some schemes’ since the funds had been locked up in long term investments. 
 From the questionnaires it was clear that already 86.5% of the sample data are 
registered members of NSSF. Of which 23% are satisfied with NSSF services. Some of the 
reasons given for satisfaction include the fact most people are aware of the tax benefits 
pegged on their NSSF contributions. Some of the positive aspects highlighted include the fact 
that all employees including self-employed persons can participate in the social security. The 
provisions that exclude contributions from attachment, including in bankruptcy proceedings, 
are commendable for their intention to insulate the retired against poverty. Most of the 
respondents are confident that NSSF will benefits will do help them meet their retirement 
needs. 
 On the other hand, some of the reasons given for those who are not comfortable with 
the act include their past bad experience with the old NSSF scheme. Respondents pointed out 
the fact that the act has several negative provisions that would impact on the retirement 
benefits industry and increase unemployment. It came out clear that the act  re-establishes a 
statutory fund with no clarity as to whether it is to take the form of a trust or a body corporate 
and the reference to “pension” schemes rather than “retirement benefit” schemes limits the 
opt-out option to pension schemes. The NSSF Board of Trustees is set up as a body corporate 
thereby causing confusion and ambiguity as to whether the Fund is established as a statutory 
fund or as a trust. Furthermore, the NSSF Board comprising two principal secretaries, seven 
cabinet secretaries and a managing trustee appointed by the Board will be largely appointed 
by the Government. The Bill makes occupiers of premises liable to inspection and any 
employer, servants and agents of such occupier, and any employee, shall be required to 
furnish a Compliance Officer all such information and documents for inspection. This is 
notwithstanding Article 31 of the Constitution that grants natural and corporate persons the 
right to privacy including the right not to have their person, home or property searched; 
information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed. The 
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Second Schedule to the Bill provides for the compulsory transfer of members from the old 
provident fund to the new fund, but prohibits the transfer of assets, including members’ 
contributions, to the new fund. 
  Misappropriation of funds and mismanagement of investments come out clear from 
most of the respondents. According to the report by Auditor General, NSSF may have 
incurred up to 76.5% of contributions on administration fees. It is on this premise that is act 
has attracted scrutiny and criticism from most of the stakeholders. 
  Transparency of the act is one of the major concerns raised by the respondents. It is 
clear that stakeholder education is needed as most of the respondents as much they are so 
emotionally negative about the bill they seem not to understand the key aspects of this bill. 
Most of the respondents were not able to clearly state what the bill states. One thing that came 
out clear is that most respondents are aware of the increase in contribution rate though they 
cannot really explain how the increase is to be incorporated. With lack of awareness, most 
stakeholders pointed out the fact that the Bill risks creating greater confusion in the retirement 
benefits sector.  As part of a solution for the same the respondents are of the opinion that 
there awareness sessions should be organized in order to enlighten the public. 
 60% of the respondents are both members of NSSF as well as private pension. 
Members are fascinated with the tier 11 option of opting out as this will help grow their 
private pension. Specifically the private pension administrators are of the opinion that this 
will help grow their industry as most of their trusted members will go for the opting out 
option. It is of concern to them that this provision of contracting out of regulations referred to 
in the Fourth Schedule, are yet to be prescribed and therefore employers cannot benefit from 
the said provisions. The CEO of RBA in his reports said that though the Bill has room for 
employers with sound benefit schemes to opt out of the mandatory NSSF contributions, the 
conditions for opting out have not been well defined under the proposed law. This is what 
brings tension to private pension holders as they are not sure if the provision may be made not 
to be in their favor hence stands a chance to lose out. 
 The opt-out provision of the NSSF Act 2013 is evidently a blessing as indicated by 
private pension scheme members. Members are of the opinion that in opting out one may use 
the opportunity to set up a private pension scheme account, take advantage of contributions 
beyond Tier 2, which are available to all members of private pension schemes as well as 
diversify your retirement savings investment strategy. Some of the reasons given as to why 
they want to remain in their private schemes included: Increased transparency on reporting 
and investing, Ease of accessing account statements, Ease of managing contributions beyond 
Tier 2, Ease of managing third party pension transactions, such as mortgage guarantees, Ease 
of accessing pension benefits upon attaining retirement age and Portability of the pension 
scheme 
 
Conclusion 
 Reforms will always be welcome. I laud efforts by the forces driving the changes in 
NSSF. We support especially the drive to at least ensure that the benefits that NSSF provides 
to Members at their retirement are meaningful and if this is the only way Members can secure 
their retirement, so be it. For employers who have adamantly refused to allow their Members 
to enjoy the benefits of having their own occupational retirement benefits schemes, the new 
Fund will at least create a platform that will allow worker feel like their retirement welfare is 
at last secure. The current move to conform NSSF to the provisions of the Retirement 
Benefits Act is also long overdue and should be encouraged. It is hoped that investment 
returns will continue to increase as the administration costs reduce or at least arrested. 
 However, we must reiterate the need for NSSF (at least in the mutated form) will be 
fully compliant with the Retirement Benefits Act and more so that its management will be 
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required to accept the complete oversight of the Retirement Benefits Authority. This will 
inject professionalism, transparency and accountability 
 There is therefore a need to engage all the stakeholders in the pension’s 
industry/sector so as to allow them air their views on the Act and have their   contributions 
incorporated. This is in line with good Corporate Governance and industry best practice. 
 It is further opined that consequent to the NSSF Act 2013, the RBA Act  No.3 of 1997  
ought to be amended  to provide that all  employers  must enlist  their   employees  in  a 
retirement  benefit  scheme  of  their   choice  or  the  NSSF. This is in line with international 
best practice industry standards.  Consequently, the Retirement Benefits Authority (RBA) 
should be mandated to fully oversee the activities of NSSF in accordance with the provisions 
of the RBA Act; 
 The Pension Industry seeks a fair competitive environment where each player is given 
a freehand to offer service to members in the retirement industry. 
 According to the ILO, Universal Pensions are basically 1st Pillar social assistance 
measures formulated and funded by the state. A major element of the scheme is “Government 
or State Funding’ through taxation measures so as to avail social security benefits to ALL 
persons and not just persons in employment.  The social assistance is most critical to persons 
who cannot afford to support themselves and usually takes the form of social programmes 
such as Income Support or un- Employment Support, housing, medical aid etc. to persons 
who are vulnerable to a society. This is the basis of the Act. 
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